How Iran Smuggles Parts for its Drones | The High Top

Kate Koren, deputy director of the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS, and Jon B. Alterman, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, discuss the global supply chains behind Iran’s weapons and the limits of the tools Washington uses to disrupt them.

Their conversation examines how cheap, decades-old commercial components end up inside Iranian drones and missiles, why China and Russia have done little to stop the flow, and how the war is shaping the way the UAE and India approach trade with Iran and the United States. Iran cannot make the integrated circuits that guide its weapons, but the basic chips, motors, and propellant chemicals it relies on are ubiquitous and move through a global trading system that handles nearly a billion shipping containers and 250 billion parcels a year.

Export controls cannot fully stop the flow of such parts, but they can raise costs, cause delays, and slow Iran’s ability to replenish what it fires, making the effort less a battle to be won than a constant fight.

Sources: CSIS (YouTube)